Shall we pay all? An experimental test of Random Incentivized Systems by Clot, Sophie et al.
Shall we pay all? An experimental test of 
Random Incentivized Systems 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Creative Commons: Attribution­Noncommercial­No Derivative Works 4.0 
Clot, S., Grolleau, G. and Ibanez, L. (2018) Shall we pay all? 
An experimental test of Random Incentivized Systems. Journal 
of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 73. pp. 93­98. 
ISSN 2214­8043 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.01.004 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/75875/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Published version at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.01.004 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.01.004 
Publisher: Elsevier 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
 1 
Shall we pay all? 
An experimental test of Random Incentivized Systems 
By SOPHIE CLOT*, GILLES GROLLEAU AND LISETTE IBANEZ 
18 January 2018 
Sophie Clot (Corresponding author) 
University of Reading  
Whiteknights street, Reading, United Kingdom 
E-mail : s.clot@reading.ac.uk  
Tel: + 44 (0)118.378.6034 
 
Gilles Grolleau (Co-author) 
CEE-M, Montpellier SupAgro, INRA, CNRS, Univ. Montpellier   
Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté, Burgundy School of Business-CEREN 
E-mail: grolleau@supagro.inra.fr  
 
Lisette Ibanez (Co-author) 
CEE-M, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro, CNRS, Univ. Montpellier 
E-mail: LISETTE.IBANEZ@INRA.FR 
 
This study seeks to investigate the impact of payment procedures on behavior in a standard 
Dictator game. Although the Between-subjects Random Incentivized System (BRIS) is 
increasingly utilized in experimental economics, its use could be contested from a purely 
theoretical point of view. In the BRIS, all subjects play the Dictator game, but only a percentage 
of subjects (e.g., 1 out of 10) are paid. The aim of this article is to test whether the results 
obtained using this system are consistent with those obtained using a conventional full payment 
system in which every subject receives payment. An additional, hypothetical treatment is also 
run. Results show a very similar pattern between the BRIS and the full payment treatment, 
whereas the hypothetical payment mechanism leads to far fewer egoistic players and far more 
egalitarians. These findings lend support to the use of BRIS as a valid experimental 
methodology.  
Keywords Random Incentive Systems, Experimental methodology, Dictator game  
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Shall we pay all? 
An experimental test of Random Incentivized Systems 
 
Experimental economics is a fast-growing field challenged by robustness and external validity 
concerns. Ever-larger samples are desired, which presents researchers with logistical and 
financial challenges (Charness et al. 2013). The Between-subject Random Incentivized System 
(BRIS) has emerged as a potential solution that could enable researchers to test ideas among 
large samples of subjects without the logistical constraints that arise with full payment systems. 
Additionally, it reduces the significant costs of paying all subjects and eases the organizational 
constraints associated with large-scale experiments. Using this mechanism, all subjects play the 
game, but only a percentage of subjects are paid. If experimenters maintain the endowment at the 
original level under this random pay procedure, the expected value of the stake (i.e. an 
individual’s statistical expectation of a gamble’s outcome) is lowered, and the effectiveness of 
the incentive becomes debatable from a methodological standpoint. Given that economic 
experiments are characterized by the use of monetary incentives, this is an important issue to 
address. In contrast to psychologists, economists argue that conditioning experimental earnings 
on individual decisions more accurately elicits ‘true’ preferences and therefore more closely 
corresponds to the 'real' decisions that individuals would actually make in the field (Kagel and 
Roth, 1995). From this perspective, incentives should therefore be designed so that rational 
individuals are able to calculate the costs and benefits of every choice (Madsen and Stenheim, 
2015). This position is based on the assumptions that individuals are rational, self-interested and 
seek to maximize their net payoffs.  
The expected value of a 10€ stake that is associated with a one-in-ten probability of receiving 
payment, for example, is 1€. In order to obtain a situation similar to that of the full pay 
experiment (in which every player receives a 10€ payment), a prescription of expected value 
theory is to increase the stake (i.e., to 100€ in this example with a winning probability of 1/10). 
Moreover, evidence has shown that people are particularly attracted to small probabilities of 
large rewards (Loewenstein et al., 2001) and generally tend to overweight small probabilities 
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(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Prelec 1998). Without such insights, how can one explain the fact 
that sales of the Euromillion 2€ lottery ticket reach up to 3 million purchases per hour at their 
peak, while the expected gain per ticket is only 0.08€? In a medical study by Volpp et al. (2008), 
using lotteries as incentives significantly and positively altered health behaviours, showing that 
even rewards with small expected value may have an incentive effect. Another variation of the 
standard payment system is the use of hypothetical payments. Also, the literature suggests that 
hypothetical payments may have a limited incentive effect. In social experiments where 
payments are hypothetical rather than real, participants act more generously and keep less money 
for themselves (Sefton (1992) and Forsythe et al. (1994)).  
  
In this study, we run a Dictator Game in the laboratory to test whether behaviour under the 
Between-subject Random Incentivized System (BRIS) is consistent with that observed under a 
standard individual payment system (Full Payment Scheme) and/or whether these behaviours 
differ substantially from that observed in a hypothetical setting. Against the standard predictions 
offered by Expected Value theory, observed behaviours in a 10€ full pay vs. a 10€ random pay 
(i.e. one-in-ten probability) experiment demonstrate very similar characteristics. Conversely, 
when the stake is increased in order to maintain a constant expected value relative to the 10€ full 
pay procedure (i.e., the chance to win 100€ with a one-in-ten probability), small behavioural 
deviations from the standard prediction emerge. Finally, when financial incentives are removed 
entirely, even greater discrepancies emerge: we observe fewer strictly egoistic players and more 
egalitarians. 
I. Background 
Despite its growing use (Clot et al. 2014, Brañas-Garza et al. 2013, Exadaktylos et al. 2013, 
Fong and Luttmer 2009, Carpenter et al. 2008, Langer and Weber 2008, Bettinger and Slonim 
2007), no clear-cut evidence from the literature demonstrates that BRIS is statistically reliable. 
More specifically, the use of the strategy method in dictator games1 offers an interesting BRIS 
variant of the standard version. With the strategy method, each subject recruited generate data, 
 
1
 Each subject plays the game as the Dictator, but would potentially be either a Dictator or Recipient with one half probability (Brañas-Garza 
et al. 2013) 
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while only half of the subjects recruited generate data in the standard version. This paper uses a 
laboratory experiment based on the standard dictator game (Forsythe et al, 1988) to address the 
following question: how does the Between-subject Random Incentivized System (BRIS) impact 
individual decision making compared to the standard incentive system? The dictator game is one 
of the most popular games among experimentalists. Using a very simple design, it is able to 
quantify systematic behavioural differences between populations. It has been run in more than 
one hundred published papers over the last three decades (Engel, 2011), consistently 
demonstrating violations of the selfishness axiom. Moreover, given that dictator games are 
susceptible to numerous types of framing effects (Brañas-Garza, 2007; Zizzo, 2010), we contend 
that any test of invariance to framing effects should include a dictator game, especially in the 
light of several recent contributions that suggest that people’s choices in dictator games change 
when the probability of realizing the decision changes (e.g., Kellner et al., 2015; Brock et al., 
2013). In this work, we analyse how certainty in regard to the realization of expected pay-offs 
impacts pro-social behaviour. The selfishness axiom of standard economic theory assumes that 
individuals seek to maximize their net payoffs and thus predicts null donations in a dictator 
game, regardless of the incentive formula. Numerous studies on pro-social preferences 
consistently show, however, that a large proportion of people donate a positive amount of money 
to an anonymous participant (Engel, 2011). According to this literature, we therefore expect to 
observe positive donations in our experiment. From the expected value theory viewpoint, if 
participants expect getting less money (e.g., 1/10 to get 10€ compared to 1/10 to get 100€), they 
are mechanically driven to give less. Indeed, the expected value of their endowment is 
respectively 1€ (respectively 10€) for the Random pay experiment – Standard stake (Random 
pay experiment – High stake). For the sake of argument, let us assume that all winning 
participants (drawn by lots) are absolute altruists and give all what they get. Even in this polar 
case, what they can give is bounded by what they can get at best, namely either 10€ in a low or 
standard stake treatment and 100€ in a high stake treatment.  In concrete terms, we expect lower 
donations as the expected value of the amount at stake is lower. Assuming that individuals are 
equally sensitive to probabilities and stakes, we expect that a higher, probabilistic stake that is 
equivalent in expected value to a lower, non-probabilistic stake should not alter individual 
decisions in a systematic way. Finally, in the hypothetical scenario, in which there is no cost of 
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giving, the social desirability bias leads us to expect to observe higher donations than in either of 
the incentivized scenarios.  
 
Psychologists generally assume that, even in the presence of monetary rewards, other factors 
that influence individual decisions (e.g. conformity, social norms) tend to override, or at least 
significantly affect, payoff-based concerns (Madsen and Stenheim, 2015). Results regarding the 
comparison of hypothetical vs. incentivized experiments in the literature are mixed, suggesting 
context dependence (i.e. type of game, sample selection). El Harbi et al. (2015; see also 
Rubinstein, 2001; 2013), for instance, compared hypothetical and incentivized experimental 
methods in the context of positional concerns. They argued that, although they may be likely to 
overestimate the proportion of socially desirable choices,2 hypothetical surveys nevertheless 
constitute a powerful complement to incentivized experiments insofar as they have the capacity 
to generate interesting qualitative insights at a low cost. Falk et al. (2016) developed a survey 
tool aiming to measure risk, time and social preferences based on hypothetical questions 
previously validated by financially incentivised experiments. Ben-Ner et al. (2008) found similar 
behavioural patterns between a dictator game played with actual money and a hypothetical 
dictator game, suggesting that the "average dictator is not acting less generously when payments 
are real than hypothetical". Nevertheless, the effect of monetary incentives depends on two 
individual traits of participants: extraversion and agreeableness.  
Studies about BRIS are scarce. A few exceptions apply, namely for the ultimatum game 
(Bolle, 1990), as well as less conventional experiments such as the ‘Deal or no Deal’ game 
(Baltussen et al., 2011). BRIS has also been studied using the Hybrid Random Incentivized 
System (HRIS) mechanism (Armantier 2006, Stahl and Haruvy 2006), which is a combination of 
BRIS and a Within-subject Random Incentivized System (WRIS).3 However, these studies 
embed confounding factors (i.e., collateral results), which obscure the issue. Additional 
 
2
 For instance, Rubinstein (2001, p. 626) states that “paying subjects will change the distribution of responses, however, assuming that we 
only want to confirm the existence of a plausible pattern of reasoning it seems unlikely that whether or not we pay the subjects will effect results 
more than an infinite number of other factors (such as, gender, age, profession, time of day, mood, etc.)”. 
3
 Broadly defined, Random Incentivized Systems include two different categories: the Within-subject Random Incentivized System (WRIS) 
and the Between-subject Random Incentivized System (BRIS). The WRIS consists in randomly paying only one task over a set of multiple tasks. 
An oft-cited argument in favor of this system is that the WRIS avoids the endowment effect (i.e. when a player’s choice is influenced by the size 
of the potential gains the player has accrued from previous games). The validity of the Within-subject RIS has been investigated in many studies. 
While past research has shown that decisions follow the rule of isolation (i.e., each decision is made independently) more than reduction (Beattie 
and Loomes 1997, Cubitt et al 1998, Camerer 1989), recent research from Cox et al. (2014) suggests that subjects do not in fact isolate each 
individual decision in multiple decision experiments. 
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probabilities inherent to either the experimental design (i.e., strategy method, risky choice) or the 
incentive mechanism (i.e., HRIS) make the full pay version of these experiments unsuitable as 
representations of baseline behaviour because they distort the elicitation of true preferences.  
Bolle (1990) compared the outcomes of $10 ultimatum games under random pay and full pay 
procedures. In the random pay experiment, 2 out of 20 subjects were randomly selected to 
receive payment. In the full pay experiment, all 24 participants were paid. The hypothesis of 
identical offers in experiments with random pay and full pay was not rejected. However, the 
ultimatum game in this experiment was run in its strategic version (i.e., each pair of subjects 
played both roles and a lottery subsequently determined which player would be the proposer). 
Given the role uncertainty in this design, even the full pay experiment does not perfectly 
correspond to decision scenarios in which the potential gain is certain. The same criticism 
applies to Baltussen et al.’s (2011) study. Their experiment mimics the choice problems in the 
TV game show Deal or No Deal. In each round of the game, a subject must choose between a 
sure alternative and a risky lottery with known probabilities. Even in the full pay version of the 
game, however, participant’s observed behaviour is presumably driven not only by their social 
preferences, but also by their risk preferences.  
In order to correctly assess the impact of a random payment alone, the experimental design 
should not involve additional probabilities and/or strategic interactions. It is for this reason that 
the dictator game in its simplest version constitutes an appropriate design to test the Between-
subject Random Incentivised System (Sefton, 1992). Sefton (1992) compared data from random 
pay dictator games with data from full pay dictator games from Forsythe et al. (1988) and 
concluded that subjects were more altruistic under uncertainty. However, this experiment has 
several limitations in terms of current methodological standards. First, the financial stake was 
moderate ($5 vs. a usual minimum of $10), and second, the sample size was relatively small (69 
pooled pairs for the full pay experiment and only 24 pairs in the random pay experiment). In 
addition, the hypothesis concerning the impact of random pay under constant expected stake 
value was not tested. 
Given that the existing literature offers no clear conclusions regarding the validity of BRIS, we 
test this payment procedure in the lab using a large sample and a standard stake size. To do so, 
we compare a full pay experiment with two versions of a random pay experiment, as well as with 
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a hypothetical experiment. Our contribution adds empirical evidence to an on-going debate 
regarding experimental methods in the field of economics (see Charness et al., 2016). 
Our experiment includes one control (full pay) treatment and three test treatments. In the first 
random pay treatment we consider the same stake as in the control treatment, but use a lottery 
procedure to determine which players actually receive payment (i.e. giving players the chance to 
win 10€ with a one-in-ten probability). The second random pay treatment consists in a lottery 
with the same probability as in treatment one. However, the stake in treatment two is increased 
so as to maintain the same expected value as the stake in the control treatment (i.e. giving players 
the chance to win 100€ with a one-in-ten probability). The third treatment is hypothetical, 
offering the same stake as in the control treatment, but does not provide participants with any 
payment at the end of the experiment (i.e. they win 10 virtual euros).  
 
II. Experimental design and data 
A. Treatments 
The experiment consists in a standard Dictator Game as proposed by Forsythe et al. (1988). A 
dictator game is a two-player game in which a certain amount of money is to be divided and one 
of the players (the dictator) decides how to divide the money. 
Our design (Table 1) includes one control treatment and three test treatments, altering two 
variables: the endowment level and the probability of actually receiving the payment (which 
determines its expected value). With respect to the endowment, all participants are asked to make 
the following decision: ‘How would you like to divide this sum of money?’. In terms of actual 
payment at the end of the experiment, all participants in the control treatment are paid according 
to the dictator’s decision, whereas in the Random pay experiments, a computerized lottery 
selects a subset of subjects who will be paid at the end of the experiment according to the 
decision they make. In the Hypothetical pay experiment, participants receive a participation fee 
only.  
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Thus, in the control session (i.e., ‘Full pay experiment’), dictators are endowed with 10€ and 
all payments are realized.4 In treatment 1, dictators also play with a 10€ stake but only have a 
one-in-ten chance of actually being paid (‘Random pay experiment - Standard stake’). In 
treatment 2, dictators play with a 100€ stake and face the same one-in-ten chance of receiving 
payment (‘Random pay experiment - High stake’). The expected value of the stake (10€) is 
identical in the control treatment and in treatment 2. In treatment 3, dictators play a hypothetical 
game with a standard 10€ stake (‘Hypothetical pay experiment’) but don't receive any payment 
based on the decision they make in the experiment.  
 
 
TABLE 1 — BETWEEN SUBJECT RANDOM INCENTIVE SYSTEM - EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN. 
 Endowment Probability Expected Value 
Control – ‘Full pay experiment’ 10€ 1/1 10€ 
Treatment 1 – ‘Random pay experiment – Standard stake’ 10€ 1/10 1€ 
Treatment 2 – ‘Random pay experiment – High stake’ 100€ 1/10 10€ 
Treatment 3 – ‘Hypothetical pay experiment’ 10€ 0 0€ 
 
B. Experimental procedure 
We conducted eight laboratory sessions, each with 20 participant pairs, at the University of 
Montpellier5 in March 2014 and September 2017.6 Participants were randomly assigned to two 
groups, split into rooms A and B. The two groups did not have any contact before, during or after 
the session. Participants were only allowed to talk to administrators. Subjects in room A were 
randomly matched with subjects in room B. Only players in Room A (i.e., dictators) made a 
decision, allocating either nothing or some portion of their endowment to player B. Before the 
experiment began, subjects were given ample time to read a written version of the instructions 
and to ask questions. Instructions for the dictator game were then read aloud to both groups.7  
Subjects were informed about the payment procedure before beginning the experiment. 
Specifically, participants in the random experiments were told, “The computer will randomly 
 
4
 Standard stakes in laboratory Dictator Games are usually 10$ (Engel 2011). 
5
 Laboratoire d’Economie Experimentale de Montpellier 
6
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting an additional treatment, which explains the period that elapsed between the first treatments 
and the hypothetical one. 
7
 Full instructions are provided in the supplementary materials. 
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select one player A for every 10 A players. Only selected A players will have their decision 
applied. The decisions of other participants will not be applied and their earnings will be zero”. 
In the third treatment, participants were informed about the hypothetical nature of their 
earnings as follows: “Suppose a hypothetical sum of 10 euros has been allocated to each pair of 
players A and B. Player A can share this hypothetical amount with Player B. (…) Player A 
makes a proposal. The proposal consists of a hypothetical amount that the player B will receive. 
(…) The hypothetical amount that player A will receive is the total amount, 10 euros, less the 
hypothetical amount that player B receives.” 
C. Subjects 
A total of 320 participants were recruited from a subject pool drawn from a database of people 
who had completed a form indicating their interest in participating in economic experiments. 
None of the subjects had previously participated in a dictator game. All subjects were paid a 6€ 
show-up fee.  
As shown in Table 2, samples are well balanced across control and test treatments. A Kruskal-
Wallis H test shows no significant differences between groups with respect to the main socio-
demographic variables. 
 
TABLE 2 -  RANDOMIZATION TABLE: KRUSKAL-WALLIS H TEST OF BETWEEN GROUP DIFFERENCES ACROSS SUBJECTS (DICTATORS) FROM CONTROL AND 
TREATMENT GROUPS. 
(N=120) (1) Control 
(2) 
Treatment 1 
(3) 
Treatment 2 
(4) 
Treatment 3 
(5) 
H-statistics 
(6) 
P-value 
Socio demographic characteristics       
Gender ratio (% of male) 40% 50% 45% 45% 0.59 0.89 
Age 26.12 23.17 27.72 23.97 2.2 0.53 
Student ratio 85% 90% 90% 95% 0.59 0.89 
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III. Results 
First, our results indicate that average transfers (in terms of percentage of the initial 
endowment) in the Full pay experiment and the Random pay experiments are very similar, but 
lower than those in the Hypothetical pay treatment. Subjects gave on average 2.7€ (SD=0.21) in 
the Full pay experiment, 2.6€ (SD=0.20) in the Random pay experiment – Standard stake (10€, 
p=0.1), 26.6€ (SD=0.19) in the Random pay experiment – High stake (100€, p=0.1) and 3.7€ 
(SD=0.19) in the Hypothetical pay experiment (10€, p=0).  
Second, we highlight two main findings that we discuss in more detail in the following 
sections. 
Result 1: The three financially incentivised treatments (Full pay, Random pay - Standard stake 
and Random pay - High stake) yield similar transfer distributions (see Figure 1).  
Result 2: There are both significantly fewer selfish subjects (who transfer nothing) and 
significantly more egalitarian subjects (who transfer half of the endowment) in the hypothetical 
treatment.  
 
A. Full pay experiment (10€) vs. Random pay experiment – Standard stake (10€, p=0.1) 
Dictator offers among the ‘Full pay experiment’ and the ‘Random pay experiment – Standard 
stake’ exhibit very similar distributions (see Figure 1). A Mann-Whitney U test reports no 
significant difference between the distributions of dictator offers across the two treatments 
(U=0.275; p=0.78). A test of equivalence (TOST - two one sided test) corroborates this result, 
finding similarity at the 0.01 level.8  
Purely selfish subjects, identified as those who make ‘zero offers’, appear in 25 percent of 
cases in the Full pay experiment, which is exactly the same proportion as in the Random pay 
 
8
 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the absence of a significant difference in the statistical test (notably, testing the null hypothesis of 
equal distribution using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test) does not prove statistical equivalence. We therefore complemented the 
analysis with a test of equivalence (Lakens, 2017). More specifically, we used a two one sided test (TOST) of equivalence, which is designed to 
provide evidence regarding the absence of a difference large enough to be considered meaningful.  
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version of the game. Egalitarian subjects, or those making fifty-fifty offers, comprise 28% of the 
sample in both versions, as well.  
In Figure 2, three quantile-quantile plots illustrate that the two distributions exhibit similar 
patterns. The majority of points in the plot for Treatment 1 fall around the 45° line, indicating 
that these two samples are characterized by very similar distributions.  
B. Full pay experiment (10€) vs. Random Pay experiment – High stake (100€, p=0.1) 
The ‘Random pay experiment - High stake’ generates a similar overall distribution as in the 
Full pay experiment, but with fewer purely selfish subjects. Although we find no statistical 
difference between the distribution of offers across these treatments (U=-0.063, p=0.94) and a 
TOST is significant at the 0.01 level, the proportion of selfish subjects is significantly lower in 
the ‘Random pay experiment - High stake’ (10% versus 25%; U=1.754, p=0.07). This results in a 
shift to low offers (ranging from 10% to 30% of the potential endowment), which occur more 
frequently than in the Full pay experiment (40% versus 20%; U=-1.94, p=0.05). The quantile-
quantile plot of Treatment 2 in Figure 2 shows small, but relatively frequent departures from the 
45° line. 
The dictator game results found by Cherry et al. (2002) corroborate the ‘zero offer’ pattern as 
being a decreasing function of the stake (‘zero offers’ decrease as the stakes increase). Possible 
explanations include a rise in culpability that is associated with purely selfish behaviour when 
the stake is high. Most importantly, this is an additional argument in favour of randomized 
incentive schemes using standard, rather than elevated, stakes as a valid preference elicitation 
mechanism. 
 
C. Full pay experiment (10€) vs. Hypothetical pay experiment (10€, p=0) 
The ‘Hypothetical experiment’ generates a different distribution than the control treatment 
(U=-1.949, p=0.05) that is driven by two main sources: 1) fewer selfish subjects (10% versus 
25%, U=1.754, p=0.07) and 2) more egalitarian subjects (47.5% versus 27.5%; U=-1.836, 
p=0.06). 
 12 
 
TABLE 3. DICTATOR OFFERS (FRACTION OF ENDOWMENT) AMONG CONTROL (FULL PAY EXPERIMENT)  
AND TEST TREATMENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0%	  5%	  
10%	  15%	  
20%	  25%	  
30%	  35%	  
40%	  45%	  
50%	  
0	   0.1	   0.2	   0.3	   0.4	   0.5	   0.6	   0.7	   0.8	   0.9	  
Full	  Pay	  (10€)	   Random	  Pay	  (10€,	  p=0.1)	   Random	  Pay	  (100€,	  p=0.1)	   Hypothetical	  Pay	  
Dictator’s offer 
(Fraction of 
endowment) 
Control – ‘Full 
pay experiment’ 
Treatment 1 – 
‘Random pay 
experiment – 
Standard stake’ 
Treatment 2 – 
‘Random pay 
experiment – High 
stake’ 
Treatment 3 – 
‘Hypothetical pay 
experiment’ 
0 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.10 
0.1 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.08 
0.2 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.05 
0.3 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 
0.4 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.13 
0.5 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.48 
0.6 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
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FIGURE 1. HISTOGRAMS OF DICTATOR OFFERS (FRACTION OF ENDOWMENT) AMONG CONTROL (FULL PAY EXPERIMENT)  
AND TEST TREATMENTS  
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FIGURE 2 – QUANTILE-QUANTILE PLOTS OF DICTATOR OFFERS BETWEEN CONTROL AND TEST TREATMENTS 
 
 
IV. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Our experiment demonstrates that subjects tend to be more influenced by the amount of the 
reward itself than by the probability of receiving it. For identical stake amounts, behaviour under 
random payment is strikingly similar to behaviour under a regular, non-probabilistic incentive 
system. For identical expected stake values, however, we observe significantly higher egoistic 
behaviour under a regular payment procedure than under a random payment procedure. Both 
findings challenge conventional predictions and may widen the scope of methods available to 
researchers seeking to test hypotheses under logistical and financial constraints. Further research 
should extend this work by testing the Between-subject Random Incentivized System with other 
games as well as with varying probabilities of payment. Another non-negligible issue concerns 
how different payment procedures could affect participation in future experiments. On the one 
hand, participants who are motivated by earning money at the end of an experiment may be 
discouraged by the use of BRIS. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that many 
individuals do not stop gambling when they do not earn (and indeed even when they lose) money 
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repeatedly. A related issue that deserves more attention is the possible long term effects of the 
widespread use of BRIS, especially among risk-averse subjects. Indeed, a widespread use of 
BRIS can lead to biased samples and results because of an involuntary selection bias against 
risk-averse subjects. Rather than proposing a conclusive finding regarding the effect of 
probabilistic outcomes on prosociality in the dictator game, we prefer to invite further research 
on the issue. 
Although further investigation into the external validity and robustness of these findings is 
required, they conceivably have interesting potential implications for policy makers. When 
designing innovative policy measures in order to encourage adherence to better habits in a 
variety of domains (e.g., environment, health, transportation security, etc.), for example, the 
BRIS procedure could be used to significantly reduce the costs of implementing financial 
incentives. Random (dis)incentivized interventions could also be a cost-effective alternative to 
existing strategies for improving compliance with public policies insofar as these strategies are 
often either too complex or too expensive to implement on large scales. As such, not only could 
the BRIS represent a useful tool for researchers seeking to maximize the value of their funding 
for economic research, but it could also have promising potential applications for policymakers 
seeking to pursue public policy objectives in a context of budgetary constraints. This insight 
echoes the sizeable literature in psychology on intermittent reinforcement, originating from the 
works of Skinner in the 1950's. Possible applications are numerous and wide-ranging, such as the 
implementation of random rewards for proper waste management or random fines for 
disregarding mandatory health measures, and constitute interesting possible directions for future 
research.   
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